[mail-vet-discuss] Draft as of 9/4/2007

[Michael Thomas]

Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
> I incorporated all of these suggestions except:
>
> Eric Allman wrote:
>> Section 5 says that relaying MTAs SHOULD NOT add an A-R header field, 
>> even if they actually do check the results and take actions on the 
>> basis of the results.  That seems like it can create a mystery.  I 
>> suggest either changing the text or adding an explanation for this 
>> behavior.
> A relaying MTA should only add an A-R header field if the border MTA 
> which will receive the message trusts the relaying MTA.  An example I 
> added shows how this might be useful.
>
> Thus I guess this should say that a relaying MTA SHOULD NOT add an A-R 
> field unless it falls within the trust boundary of the domain to which 
> it is relaying.
I frankly don't think it's anybody's business which mta a should or 
should not
add an auth-res. There's nothing we can do to prevent this sort of
behavior, and I certainly wouldn't change mine based on this draft. it's 
the job
of the incoming domain to strip out potentially untrusted auth-res anyway.


       Mike