[ietf-dkim] 23 again (sorry John) was Output summary - proposing ODID "Originating Domain Identity"

[John R. Levine]

> Alternatively we can allow it, warn, and expect implementers to code
> heuristics that can discern attacks from regular footers.

Speaking as an implementer, I ignore l=, because the hassle of working 
around it and trying to guess how hostile any added content might be is 
vastly greater than any utility it has.  As I've often noted, there are 
about a hundred ways that a mailing list can break a signature, and l= 
deals (badly) with only one of them.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl at iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly