[ietf-dkim] detecting header mutations after signing
johnl at iecc.com
Mon Oct 18 17:50:25 PDT 2010
>> difference between a green bar SSL page and one with no SSL. I don't want
>> to mess with the MUA at all, but rather use DKIM to help decide what
>> messages to show her and which messages to consign to the junk folder.
>Why do we think such a sorting module can't/won't have the
>intelligence to do the RFC5322 Section 3.6 checks?
Sheesh, I think I've answered this at least three times now. In the
absence of a DKIM signature, there is no reason to worry about doubled
headers since there is no reason to think one is "real" and the other
"fake". They're only a threat when they provide a way to make a DKIM
signed message render differently from what the signer expected.
No DKIM -> no threat -> no special treatment. I don't know how to
make this any clearer. That's why sorting modules don't worry about
As I've also said before, either DKIM has a SHOULD about doubled
headers, or the equivalent advice goes into the folklore about what
you have to do make DKIM useful. Personally, I think the latter would
be a cruel joke on future implementors, but apparently other people
More information about the ietf-dkim