[ietf-dkim] layer violations, was detecting header mutations after signing
John R. Levine
johnl at iecc.com
Thu Oct 14 07:58:35 PDT 2010
> Perhaps surprisingly, having redundant header fields does not make DKIM
We must have some vastly different definition of "break".
If allowing through modified messages that render very differently isn't
broken, shouldn't we remove the advice against signing with l=0? The
advice in favor of signing Subject: and To: fields? None of those has any
technical effect on the ability of a verifier to compute and compare
If not, what's the difference, other than the fact that we thought of some
of them several years ago and just noticed these last week?
John Levine, johnl at iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly
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