[ietf-dkim] detecting header mutations after signing

[Murray S. Kucherawy]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org [mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Alessandro Vesely
> Sent: Friday, October 08, 2010 8:34 AM
> To: ietf-dkim at mipassoc.org
> Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] detecting header mutations after signing
> 
> The whole discussion on multiple "From"s then boils down on whether it
> is worth to change the protocol so that, for example,
> "h=from:subject:date:message-id:to" MUST be interpreted by the
> verifier to mean
> "h=from:from:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to", a
> handy abbreviation for known fields.

I'm still cringing at the layering violation of "fixing" in DKIM the fact that many RFC5322 implementations, MTAs, MSAs and MUAs alike, don't bother to enforce normative portions of that specification.

Is there precedent of this being done elsewhere, i.e. compensating in one protocol for abundant lousy implementations of a layer below it?