[ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault
Murray S. Kucherawy
msk at cloudmark.com
Tue Sep 14 21:11:14 PDT 2010
Based on that (rather precise) description, aren't ADSP's requirements a proper subset of the DKIM requirements? If so, I'm not sure I agree with "badly conflicting", but it does frame future discussion quite nicely.
For example, if DKIM enables the identification of mail streams, isn't the one ADSP covers just a specific instance of a mail stream?
From: ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org [ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Steve Atkins [steve at wordtothewise.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 14, 2010 3:01 PM
To: DKIM List
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault
The problem is that the two things have badly conflicting requirements. DKIM is based on a domain-based identifier that's independent of the From: domain, and that's where much of it's value comes from. ADSP is based on a domain-based identifier that must remain identical to the From: field at all times, and that's where it's sole value comes from. ADSP intrinsically conflicts with the original design case for DKIM, despite being piggy-backed on to it.
So any document that puts forth even basic good practices for DKIM usage for monitoring sender reputation (use d= to differentiate mail streams) is going to be anathema to ADSP requirements (d= must be the same as the From: domain).
And any ADSP-driven set of requirements (mailing lists should not only re-sign any mail they re-send, they should alter the From: address to match) is going to be considered nonsensical by people who consider DKIM a way to tie an identity cookie to a message.
And, as we've seen, any compromise document is hated by pretty much everyone, even assuming you can get there.
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