[ietf-dkim] DKIM+ADSP = FAIL, and it's our fault
steve at wordtothewise.com
Tue Sep 14 15:01:20 PDT 2010
On Sep 14, 2010, at 12:35 PM, J.D. Falk wrote:
> ...but not for the reasons the anti-ADSP folks keep bringing up.
> DKIM is failing because every discussion about actually /using/ DKIM inevitably gets stuck in the same old argument about ADSP. Doesn't even matter what the argument is about anymore; it stops all forward progress every time. And we keep letting it happen -- actively participating, even, including me.
> Continuing to argue these same points over and over is disrespectful of our colleagues both on and off this list, and of the IETF process.
> So I'm going to stop, and I beg you all to join me.
> Stop arguing, and start writing drafts. Let us discuss the drafts instead of attacking each others' intractable positions for the Nth time. If you think ADSP will bring about the end of all human communication, WRITE A DRAFT EXPLAINING WHY. If you think something else, write that instead.
> Yes, I know it requires more effort, but what we've been doing so far clearly isn't working.
The problem is that the two things have badly conflicting requirements. DKIM is based on a domain-based identifier that's independent of the From: domain, and that's where much of it's value comes from. ADSP is based on a domain-based identifier that must remain identical to the From: field at all times, and that's where it's sole value comes from. ADSP intrinsically conflicts with the original design case for DKIM, despite being piggy-backed on to it.
So any document that puts forth even basic good practices for DKIM usage for monitoring sender reputation (use d= to differentiate mail streams) is going to be anathema to ADSP requirements (d= must be the same as the From: domain).
And any ADSP-driven set of requirements (mailing lists should not only re-sign any mail they re-send, they should alter the From: address to match) is going to be considered nonsensical by people who consider DKIM a way to tie an identity cookie to a message.
And, as we've seen, any compromise document is hated by pretty much everyone, even assuming you can get there.
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