[ietf-dkim] chained signatures, was l= summary

[John R. Levine]

>> DKIM is too complicated as it is, and it strikes me as an extremely poor
>> idea to add yet more cruft to work around perverse situations that are as
>> yet (and probably always) entirely hypothetical.
>
> I don't understand what "cruft" you think I'm talking about.

Telling people that it is reasonable to add a chain of A-R headers to 
messages with broken signatures, and expecting recipients to apply some 
ill defined algorithm to decide how much they believe each level of 
alleged signature.

I would really like to remove l= from DKIM to make it clear that it is not 
a good idea to even try to guess the history of a message based on 
signatures that don't verify and cover the whole messag.

R's,
John