[ietf-dkim] protecting domains that don't exist

Steve Atkins steve at blighty.com
Tue Apr 29 08:38:56 PDT 2008


On Apr 29, 2008, at 8:36 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:

> Steve Atkins wrote:
>> It doesn't contain any operational justification or goal for
>> SSP. It describes what (one person) wants from SSP, it
>> does not explain why, and it definitely doesn't provide the
>> operational problem that SSP is intended to mitigate.
>>
>
>
> Well, I really don't know where to begin.  Here's the text.
>
>>   DomainKeys Identified Mail [RFC4871] defines a message level  
>> signing
>>   and verification mechanism for email.  While a DKIM signed message
>>   speaks for itself, there is ambiguity if a message doesn't have a
>>   valid first party signature (i.e., on behalf of the [RFC2822].From
>>   address): is this to be expected or not?  For email, this is an
>>   especially difficult problem since there is no expectation of a
>>   priori knowledge of a sending domain's practices.  This ambiguity  
>> can
>>   be used to mount a bid down attack that is inherent with systems  
>> like
>>   email that allow optional authentication: if a receiver doesn't  
>> know
>>   otherwise, it should not assume that the lack of a valid  
>> signature is
>>   exceptional without other information.  Thus, an attacker can take
>>   advantage of the ambiguity and simply not sign messages.  If a
>>   protocol could be developed for a domain to publish its DKIM  
>> signing
>>   practices, a message verifier could take that into account when it
>>   receives an unsigned piece of email.
>
> Put another way, you can't tell the difference between "doesn't use  
> DKIM" with "this is a forged message" without either SSP or some out- 
> of-band (and unmentioned) mechanism.  If you're asking for more  
> specifics about what YOU should do with a message once it's  
> determined to (a) not have a valid signature and (b) have a policy  
> of signing all messages, I'm afraid that Dave and others have  
> befuddled this group into thinking that's a bad idea and somehow out  
> of scope.

And what's the actual operational goal for this?

If you can't give me the general goal, a concrete example or
two would be a good start.

Cheers,
   Steve



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