[ietf-dkim] Re: ISSUE 1521 -- Limit the application of SSP to unsigned messages

Hector Santos hsantos at santronics.com
Fri Jan 25 09:32:23 PST 2008


Mark Delany wrote:
> On Jan 24, 2008, at 6:14 PM, Hector Santos wrote:

> But to disagree with you, I voted +1 precisely for technical reasons. I 
> want a simple solution that non-WG-specialists can grok.  I don't think 
> we have that today.

Well Mark, I'm surprise if you really mean that.  If you are saying this 
from a managerial standpoint just to get this effort rubber stamp, then 
  I suggest to get an engineer on top of this.  If you are saying this 
from an engineering standpoint, then I have to believe you have it in 
your vains to see how issue 1521 is going to negatively impact the 
general wide adoption of DKIM/SSP.

In short, if we accept 1521, then receivers can only implement DKIM/SSP 
with a "batteries required" concept - 3rd party reputation services.

Here is a synopsis of the situation:

In 5016 requirement #9, we have:

    9.  SSP MUST NOT be required to be invoked if a valid first party
        signature is found.

We got it to this point where everyone compromise based on the secured 
idea that forging a 1st party key would need to be done with internal 
theft in order to exploit it.

Now with the new text, the desire is that SSP doesn't apply even for 
valid 3rd party signatures.

So the "new requirement #9" based on ISSUE 1521, we would have to change 
it to:

    9.  SSP MUST NOT be required to be invoked if any valid
       (first or third party signature) is found.

Well, we been through this exercise before and it was proven that this 
can be a major exploit.   We shown over and over again during the DKIM 
Threat Analysis.

Today, as shown by the deployment guide, the only way to honor this is 
to implement reputation services when there is a VALID signature.  And 
please note very strongly, the guide also says that no 
accreditation/reputation scheme, not even the valid signature is good.

I see this "strategic" as a major technical design mistake.

We do have implementation issues with ESP.  But there are not ones that 
are not solvable and no one is suggestion that reputation services are 
not valuable.  But to require a non-standard procedure (batteries) as 
part as RFC standard IMV is going to raise the barrier of wide adoption.


-- 
Sincerely

Hector Santos, CTO
http://www.santronics.com
http://santronics.blogspot.com



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