[ietf-dkim] Re: New Issue: Use of XPTR records in SSP

[Douglas Otis]

On Apr 18, 2007, at 12:00 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:

> On Wednesday 18 April 2007 14:51, Douglas Otis wrote:
>
>> Rejection at the MTA offers an allusion of protection.  Protection  
>> through rejection alone remains prone to look-alike and cousin  
>> domain exploits, growing ever more problematic with the  
>> introduction of Internationalizations.  Dependence upon an  
>> allusion of protection creates a larger number of victims.  There  
>> can be no half measures with respect to security.
>
> Then I guess your solution is to do nothing until we have a  
> complete solution to the entire phishing problem?

Those domains with email being phished SHOULD implement DKIM.   
Perhaps they could publish a policy record at their principal  
domain.  DKIM used in conjunction with aggressive anti-phishing  
filtering will not need policy records to be wildcarded.

Phishing will not be slowed substantially solely by email-address  
policy rejections at the MTA.  DKIM is _not_ an anti-spam mechanism  
for many reasons.

Anti-phishing requires message analysis of content.  Such content is  
not covered by an email-address policy.  Anti-phishing must not  
depend upon a recipient being able to visually recognize trustworthy  
email-addresses.

-Doug