Additional lookups (was Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: 1368 straw-poll)
wietse at porcupine.org
Fri Mar 2 08:22:22 PST 2007
> On Thu, 01 Mar 2007 13:44:21 -0000, Wietse Venema <wietse at porcupine.org>
> > On a friendly internet with only cooperating parties, this might
> > make sense. But the world has changed. With today's internet it
> > would be a fundamental mistake to make more distinctions than:
> > the signature was verified
> > other
> > If the verifier gives different treatments to different types of
> > "other", then the bad guys will exploit the verifier's behavior.
> And how do you stop verifiers doing that?
There is no cure for stupidity, but I can try to educate.
> Verifiers will do as they think fit (i.e. what their clients will pay
> for), whatever our standards say. If some likely (though deprecated)
> verifier behaviour leads to exploits by the Bad Guys, and there is an easy
> way to counter the exploit (e.g. by clearer information in the SSP), then
> it would be wise to dopt it.
> "Defence in depth" is the term, I believe.
SSP is not a cure for exploitable verifiers.
"Wrong solution for the wrong problem" is the term, I believe.
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