[ietf-dkim] draft-ietf-dkim-base-08 submitted

Douglas Otis dotis at mail-abuse.org
Fri Jan 19 10:23:07 PST 2007


On Jan 19, 2007, at 10:06 AM, <Bill.Oxley at cox.com> wrote:

> I thought this was resolved via an expiration date x= flag. With  
> this flag set a mua could certainly know whether a signature was  
> still valid before attempting to verify it.

The critical element should be whether the message's signature had  
expired prior to delivery, which can be determined by checking when  
the message was received.  This check could be made days later and  
yet safely used to abate abusive replay of messages.  There is no  
need to rapidly remove valid keys and thereby make MUA verification  
precarious.  Retaining public keys for a reasonable period would be a  
reasonable strategy.  Implying that all checking must be done by the  
MTA fails miserably in efforts aimed at protecting recipients.  DKIM  
is not only about ensuring the acceptance of bulk email by the MTA.

-Doug



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