[ietf-dkim] Re: Collection of use cases for SSP requirements

Douglas Otis dotis at mail-abuse.org
Fri Nov 17 13:44:51 PST 2006


On Nov 17, 2006, at 1:16 PM, Charles Lindsey wrote:

> Reputation information cannot come from SSP. All SSP can tell you  
> is what the owner of each domain chooses to tell you. Reputation  
> information will come from third parties, so you have to decide  
> which third parties to believe.

Reputation, good or bad, can not come from the DKIM signature either.

DKIM only indicates who signed the content of the message, not who  
addressed the envelope and sent the message.  Reputation information  
seldom depends upon the message's content for asserting a bad  
reputation.  Only when the content is perhaps criminal in nature  
could content alone provide enough information for asserting a  
negative reputation.  A good reputation is equally problematic.   
Reporting that example.com has a "good" reputation will likely invite  
spammers to this domain.  Spammers would then send themselves  
messages signed by example.com.  These messages can then be  
immediately replayed from all parts unknown.  Saying anything bad  
about a domain will be problematic, as will saying anything good.

Being able to associate the signing domain with that of the SMTP  
client safely allows white-listing which protects the "good"  
assertion from being abused.  This technique could also be used to  
associate the various email-address fields with that of the signing  
domain as well.  An association technique would allow email-address  
domain owners to freely select their providers.  Domain owners would  
not need to coordinate the exchange of private keys, zone  
delegations, or allowing them to create your private keys and  
referencing their public key using a CNAME record.  The providers  
would also have abuse feedback directed to them.

Security is improved by providing an association scheme. The cost of  
the email service is reduced, and there would be greater consumer  
freedom.  The converse of sharing your domain zone or provide keys  
with these providers does not enhance anyone's freedom.  A message  
signed by a large domain is no better than that signed by a smaller  
domain.  When a smaller domain is known to be good, the smaller  
domain has the advantage.  Clearly allowing signing domain  
designation would be beneficial to the smaller entities.

-Doug



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