[ietf-dkim] Collection of use cases for SSP requirements

Steve Atkins steve at blighty.com
Thu Nov 9 07:25:21 PST 2006


On Nov 9, 2006, at 4:33 AM, Charles Lindsey wrote:

> On Wed, 08 Nov 2006 16:43:58 -0000, Steve Atkins  
> <steve at blighty.com> wrote:
>
>> On Nov 8, 2006, at 8:10 AM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
>>>
>>> I agree that this does not help with look-alike domains, but for  
>>> phishing
>>> that uses a sender's domain, I'm noy sure what you are getting at?
>>
>> You point out the underlying issue nicely.
>
> Well at least it is a start to force the phishers into using look- 
> alikes.

No, it isn't. There is no way in which SSP makes this better.
Depending on how it's implemented by recipients there are ways
in which it makes it worse.

>> Phishing doesn't have to use the real domain. There are *countless*
>> ways of phishing that don't require it. Even now, a lot of phish  
>> mails
>> don't bother using the real domain, even though there's no real
>> disincentive to do so in most cases. If there were even a minor
>> disincentive then they could move away from that today with
>> minimal inconvenience.
>>
>> Many of them use their own domains, for which they could trivially
>> publish SSP data.
>
> Which is where we need sites on which "reputations" can be queried.  
> I envisage these will operate rather like the present DNSBL  
> blacklists. You choose such a site that you trust, and then ask its  
> advice on the action you should take according to the signer, From  
> address, etc. I would suppose that phishers own domains would  
> rapidly acquire a rather poor reputation (and the advice should be  
> to "delete all mail where the signature succeeds, and even where it  
> doesn't").

If you need an external trust model to tell you whether you should
trust SSP, then you can simply use just the external model and
avoid the whole self-publication thing altogether.

Then whence SSP?

(And, more to the point, if we all agree that SSP is pointless
without a third party trust model then the SSP specification is
neither complete, nor ready to review, until that trust model
is also defined).

Cheers,
   Steve



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