[ietf-dkim] Re: How MALLET PERFORMS a DOWNGRADE ATTACK
pbaker at verisign.com
Thu Aug 3 07:07:39 PDT 2006
The working group decided that it would not discuss downgrade attacks in BASE.
I said at the time I would raise them in policy. The only reason to have policy is to stop a downgrade attack.
Unless you understand that you don't understand policy. The only reason that DKIM has a policy layer is to prevent an attack where the attacker sends a message without a signature or with an unverifiable signature because the signature alg, digest or C18n algorithm are not supported by that receiver.
I am getting a bit fed up of folk who first say they don't understand policy and then opine about what policy must be and tell everyone else that they are wrong.
This is a much simpler task than people are making it out to be.
If policy is on the table then so is discussion of the downgrade attack.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org
> [mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces at mipassoc.org] On Behalf Of Dave Crocker
> Sent: Wednesday, August 02, 2006 6:46 PM
> To: Stephen Farrell
> Cc: ietf-dkim at mipassoc.org
> Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] Re: How MALLET PERFORMS a DOWNGRADE ATTACK
> Stephen Farrell wrote:
> > Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> >> NO MALLET PERFORMS A SUCCESSFUL DOWNGRADE ATTACK.
> > I could quibble. That's not a downgrade attack since Alice
> > parallel-signed with both.
> I was under the impression that the working group had said
> that it was not concerned about downgrade attacks, for the
> DKIM usage being discussion.
> Assuming I got that correct, why is it still being discussed?
> Dave Crocker
> Brandenburg InternetWorking
> NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
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