[ietf-dkim] Are verifiers expected to query SSP on a
ietf-dkim at kitterman.com
Tue Aug 1 21:15:00 PDT 2006
On Tue, 01 Aug 2006 15:05:07 -0700 Michael Thomas <mike at mtcc.com> wrote:
>Scott Kitterman wrote:
>>Yes. I would also say that is explicitly not a requirement that this be
>>done without breaking some existing e-mail functionailty. I don't think
>>it's doable otherwise.
>>I expect that this is a choice that would only be taken by a small
>>of domains that are:
>>1. Substantial phishing targets.
>>2. Willing to accept the collateral damage.
>>I do think it important to specify this type of approach.
>I agree about the collateral damage part and it being acceptable for
>some audiences but what I'd really like to do is phrase these in terms
>of what the signer's practice/policy is instead of what the signer hopes
>the receiver might do.
>In particular, it seems that there are two different cases:
>1) I sign all of the mail from this domain, and I don't expect that the
> places I send will suffer from transit damage
>2) I sign all of my mail but I may send to places that may incur transit
I wonder how what the receiver would do would differ.
In either case as a receiver I would reject it at the border MTA and never
let it into my network if the message was outside the scope of this kind of
What I think the sender is trying to limit messages allegedly from their
domain that receivers will accept. I think the only difference between
your two cases is the amount of collateral damage the sender is expecting.
I see it as a difference of quantity, not kind.
I do agree that trying to phrase it in terms of what the sender is trying
to achieve is a good idea.
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