[ietf-dkim] editorials and nits

[Paul Hoffman]

Agree with all, except...

At 11:28 PM +0100 7/1/06, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>#2 1.1, 1st set of bullets. The biggest difference between dkim and s/mime or
>pgp signatures IMO is that with dkim we do not expect that signature failure
>will lead to message (delivery) failure, whereas with s/mime or pgp we do. I'd
>mention this in a bullet.

Fully disagree. There is no expectation of non-delivery for signature 
failures in S/MIME or OpenPGP.

>#33, Appendix B. I expected to see a bit here about the type of setup
>we have at IETF meetings, where the IETF's MTA signs and the verifier
>has to handle the From being nothing like the signer identity.

Disagree. Leave as-is.

>#34, Appendix C. I think that this can be deleted. Others may disagree.

Disagree. :-) It helps novice implementers.

>In any case, the text says 768 and the command line 1024, no
>password handling is shown and the last part could confuse since
>that signature is not usable for DKIM. So if this isn't deleted, then
>a bunch of changes are needed.

Agree.