[ietf-dkim] editorials and nits
phoffman at proper.com
Sat Jul 1 19:01:45 PDT 2006
Agree with all, except...
At 11:28 PM +0100 7/1/06, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>#2 1.1, 1st set of bullets. The biggest difference between dkim and s/mime or
>pgp signatures IMO is that with dkim we do not expect that signature failure
>will lead to message (delivery) failure, whereas with s/mime or pgp we do. I'd
>mention this in a bullet.
Fully disagree. There is no expectation of non-delivery for signature
failures in S/MIME or OpenPGP.
>#33, Appendix B. I expected to see a bit here about the type of setup
>we have at IETF meetings, where the IETF's MTA signs and the verifier
>has to handle the From being nothing like the signer identity.
Disagree. Leave as-is.
>#34, Appendix C. I think that this can be deleted. Others may disagree.
Disagree. :-) It helps novice implementers.
>In any case, the text says 768 and the command line 1024, no
>password handling is shown and the last part could confuse since
>that signature is not usable for DKIM. So if this isn't deleted, then
>a bunch of changes are needed.
More information about the ietf-dkim