[ietf-dkim] base-02 // Parent signing security considerations v.2

Paul Hoffman phoffman at proper.com
Wed Jun 7 18:00:47 PDT 2006


At 5:31 PM -0700 6/7/06, Douglas Otis wrote:
>: Keys published by common higher-level domains
>:
>: Although TLD managers are trustees for the delegated domain, DKIM
>: introduces a security concern unrelated to domain delegation.
>: Registry Operator Functional Specification Agreements normally
>: preclude registering "_domainkey" due to the underscore character.
>: This limitation is expected to also preclude TLD managers from
>: publishing the "_domainkey" label as a subdomain.  There are also
>: unsanctioned alternative TLD managers and SLDs managers operating
>: under a variety agreements known to include domains exceeding
>: normally prescribed characters.
>:
>: By utilizing the unqualified subdomains of the DKIM-Signature
>: header field 'i=' parameter, a DKIM key can be referenced
>: from any higher level domain to validate an email-address
>: containing these subdomains.  This provision might be exploited
>: to usurp the validation of an email-addresses of a lower domain.
>: As a result, DKIM keys published at a higher level could expose
>: subdomains to harm from a possible security breach at a higher
>: level and to conflicts with regard to what is a valid
>: email-address.  For example, the key's 'g=' localpart template
>: provision permitting MUA signing does not restrict the
>: subdomains that can be included within the DKIM-Signature 'i='
>: parameter.
>:
>: Unless otherwise already preclude by existing agreements, a
>: DKIM operator will need to establish separate agreements
>: governing the high-level domain's covenants as related to the
>: specific use of the "_domainkey" subdomain.  These new functional
>: requirements should include limitations on key retention periods,
>: key sizes, the handling of the private key, and whether
>: address validation assertions are permitted within lower
>: level domains.

-1, for many of the same reasons stated before. Plus there is now the 
new, impossible-to-mitigate threat of alternate roots.


More information about the ietf-dkim mailing list