[ietf-dkim] issues disposition

Stephen Farrell stephen.farrell at cs.tcd.ie
Thu Mar 9 06:25:22 PST 2006


Hi All,

Barry and I went over the current issues list [1] (rt.psg.com version)
and went back over the list archive (where we found a couple of missed
ones). The attached represents our classification of all those.

Regards,
Stephen.

[1] 
https://rt.psg.com/Search/Results.html?Query=Queue%20%3D%20'dkim'%20AND%20(Status%20%3D%20'open'%20OR%20Status%20%3D%20'new')&Rows=50
-------------- next part --------------

--- Notes

Note that these states were allocated wearing our WG chair hats. If someone
wants to re-open an issue then they need to get two other list participants to
also argue their case.

All OPEN issues for threats-01 and base-00 will be on the agenda in Dallas.

Eliot will create new entires in the tracker for NNNN issues.

Explanation of states used:

PROPOSE REJECT - if no-one objects within a week then this changes to 
                 REJECT, if someone objects it changes to OPEN
REJECT - resolved issue with no changes to be made
OPEN - still up for discussion
ACCEPT - resolved issue with a consensus change yet to be made
DONE - resolved issue with consensus change applied


-- threats issues

1170	 Introduction lacks the introduction of SSP	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	hsantos at santronics.com	6 weeks ago		6 weeks ago	0
	PROPOSE REJECT no support for change, but no discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001883.html

1171	draft-ietf-dkim-threats-00 Clarification of the DKIM mechanism	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	6 weeks ago		6 weeks ago	0
	I think the title above doesn't match the thread which was "Misstatement of the..." ?
	OPEN got some support, no list opposition, but not included in threats-01
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001907.html

1172	disagreement on impact and probability of Attacks Against Message Signatures	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	6 weeks ago		6 weeks ago	0
	OPEN some discussion, no clear consensus to change or not
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001910.html

1173	Does Section 4.1.4 properly address traceability and accountability?	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	6 weeks ago		6 weeks ago	0
	REJECT no support for change
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001909.html

1174	raft-ietf-dkim-threats-00 Limited information in a critical section	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	6 weeks ago		2 days ago	0
	REJECT no support for change
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001908.html

1180	draft-ietf-dkim-threats-00 DKIM can be effective within the Originator's AdmD	open	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	REJECT no support for change
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/001941.html

1181	Misleading figure in 1.1	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	nobody at xyzzy.claranet.de	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	PROPOSE REJECT no support for change, editor opposed but no other discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002471.html

1182	Eavesdropping may permit man-in-the-middle as well	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	dotis at mail-abuse.org	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	PROPOSE REJECT no support for change, no discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002008.html

1186	4.2 needs new Attack Item: Inconsistent Signature vs Policy Attacks	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	hsantos at santronics.com	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	DONE - new SSP attack added to threats-1 (section 4.2.6)
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002015.html

1192	TLD key publication and signing	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	Mike.Markley at bankofamerica.com	3 weeks ago		3 weeks ago	0
	DONE - new threat added to threats-01 in section 4.1.18
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002152.html

1206	Threats Issue - Large DNS records make servers targets for spoofed source amplification attacks abuse	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	william at elan.net
	DONE - threats-01 has a new section 4.3.1 just for this.
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002435.html

NNNN	Threat-00 Limiting the scope of trust
	dotis at mail-abuse.org
	REJECT - no consenus on this change
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002073.html


-- base issues

1183	carryover: draft-allman-dkim-base-01.txt - Should we have an r= tag in either the signature or key record	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	lear at ofcourseimright.com	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	OPEN
	no thread?

1184	carryover: Develop plan for transition of multiple crypto algs (a=)	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	lear at ofcourseimright.com	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - not much discussion of how to transition, though not much disagreement either
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002414.html

1185	carryover: draft-allman-dkim-base-01.txt Transition sha-1 to sha-256	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	lear at ofcourseimright.com	5 weeks ago		5 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - not quite closed on the actual exact wording
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002414.html

1190	base-00 3.5 x=	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	nobody at xyzzy.claranet.de	3 weeks ago		3 weeks ago	0
	REJECT - change opposed, proposer accepted leaving MUST
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002131.html

1193	base spec: instead of signing the message, sign the hash	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	lear at ofcourseimright.com	3 weeks ago		3 weeks ago	0
	OPEN 
	no (recent) thread

1194	base spec: whitespace in signature?	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	eric at sendmail.com	3 weeks ago		3 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - not sure if this is the right thread
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002464.html	

1195	draft-ietf-dkim-base-00 - 3.4.6 Example (Canonicalization)	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	hsantos at santronics.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - no discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002148.html

1196	Base: Upgrade indication and protection against downgrade attacks	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	MarkD+dkim at yahoo-inc.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - lots of discussion, no clear closure
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002163.html

1200	MUST vs SHOULD in Verifier Actions section (-base)	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	eric at sendmail.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	OPEN
	not sure which thread

1201	change the syntax from SPF compat to human compat	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	MarkD+dkim at yahoo-inc.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	OPEN
	not sure which thread

1203	extendable RR records?	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	tony at att.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	ACCEPT - the title of this issue is misleading, its really about extra options to be specified in a DKIM TXT record
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002260.html

1204	issue with DKIM simple header algorithm and milter-based implementations	new	dkim	Nobody	0
	tony at att.com	2 weeks ago		2 weeks ago	0
	OPEN - seemed like consensus but no clear change
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002273.html

NNNN	clarifications on use of l= tag
	Eric Allman
	OPEN - no discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002185.html

NNNN	signature h= and z= tags
	Hector Santos
	OPEN - little discussion
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002375.html

-- SSP issues

NNNN	should we drop the cryptic o=. syntax for something a little more readable?
	Mark Delaney
	OPEN
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002219.html

NNNN	should r= be localpart only?
	Mark Delaney
	OPEN
	http://mipassoc.org/pipermail/ietf-dkim/2006q1/002220.html



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