[ietf-dkim] Charter bashing...

[Amir Herzberg]

Arvel Hathcock wrote:
>>   ? supporting multiple signatures on single messages 
> 
> Humm... not sure about this one.  If verifiers only supported a single 
> signature it would be wise for signers to strip out any existing 
> signatures before re-signing.  That would cause the loss of 
> "potentially" useful data wouldn't it?  But, come to think of it, old 
> signatures don't verify (otherwise, why resign the message at all) 
There may be cases where an intermediary (e.g. MTA or mailing list) 
which DKIM-signs its outgoing messages, will receive a DKIM-signed 
message, e.g. if the MUA signed it (for MTA), or if the sending domain 
signed it (for mailing list). In some of these cases, the original 
signature may still provide additional useful information for the 
recipient. Why should we exclude this? The only good answer I see if 
simplicity, but I think determining that the complexity/functionality 
tradeoff justifies excluding this should not be done at the chartering 
phase, and requires fair evaluation.
-- 
Best regards,

Amir Herzberg

Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science
Bar Ilan University
http://AmirHerzberg.com
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