[ietf-dkim] Not exactly not a threat analysis
mike at mtcc.com
Wed Aug 17 08:09:30 PDT 2005
Earl Hood wrote:
> On August 16, 2005 at 19:11, Michael Thomas wrote:
>>I'm not entirely sure I understand what's being discussed here,
>>but if you had to resign each message for a different rcpt-to,
>>you'd significantly up the cost of signing for things like
>>forwarders and exploders. The cost of RSA signing is still
>>not _completely_ insignificant.
> Again, this increases the cost to the sender, which may be desirable.
> I'm not sure if the cost is worth worry about for forwarders and
> exploders. For those that handle high volume, they probably
> have the hardware resource to deal with volume of signing.
Or more likely, they'll not deal with any of this tomfoolery.
More information about the ietf-dkim