[ietf-dkim] a bit of philosophy on working group productivity
ietf-dkim at kitterman.com
Sun Aug 14 15:28:42 PDT 2005
Dave Crocker wrote:
>>> But first we need to do *anything at all* that is useful.
>>> As of today, there is no standardized transit-time message authentication
>>> technique. If we can produce a standard that permits validating ANY
>>> with a signed message, we will have created a stable base for all sorts
>>> of enhancements.
>> Perhaps, but a stable base for future enhancements that will actually have
>> some utility is not, I would think, something useful.
> You seem to have missed the "but first" paragraph.
I think not. I think I'm trying to say that what you defined as
minimally useful isn't sufficently useful to be worth the effort of a
working group. I think the minimum needs to be higher.
>> Unless the output of this putative group would at least enable a receiver to
>> reject a 'bad' message or have more confidence in a 'good' message there is
>> no incentive for either senders or receivers to deploy.
> for some definitions of good messages and bad message.
Yes. Up to the receiver to decide that. I won't even try to come up
with a universal definition.
>> It would seem to me that there is a necessary tie between the identity being
>> signed, some e-mail identity that end uses actually see, and some type of
>> sender policy declaration that would allow receivers to have some idea how
>> to interpret the presence, absence, and validity of signatures.
> Quite a bit of useful filtering is done today that does not require the end-user
> to participate directly and does not involve knowing the sender's "policies" and
> does not require using the rfc2822.from field.
Yes. All of which does not require MASS or DKIM.
What I am attempting to say is that I do not believe there is any
sigificant value in signing some new, invisible e-mail identity. For it
to have value, it needs to relate to a current, visible identity. It
also needs to be tied to some sort of sender policy because otherwise
there is no reliable way to know what the presence or absence of a
particular signature is supposed to mean other than in the case of a
valid signature for an identity that is identical to the body From:.
If all I want is a cryptgraphically valid signature, there are other
ways to get it.
I thought your thread was about what is the minimum we can accomplish
that will be worthwhile. I think that's about as low as the bar goes.
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