Design approach to MASS (was Re: [ietf-dkim] On per-user-keying)

[Dave Crocker]

(mailsig list dropped off.  we need to move dkim discussions to the dkim list.)



>  DKIM violates basic software design principles.

As noted, DKIM is a protocol specification, not a software design.  

The difference is important. In doing protocol design -- especially for the open 
Internet -- there is a challenge in structuring things for extensibility and 
structuring them for coherence, ease of understanding, and (therefore) ease of 
interoperability.  

John Levine's citation of failure examples is worth considering carefully.  So 
it a review of IETF successes.


>  For example, computing a cryptographic hash of mail message data (including
>  canonicalization methods) in itself is a useful capability.

Since DKIM has a number of parametric components, including canonicalization and 
signature algorithm choices, I do not understand what additional factoring you 
are concerned about.  

It sounds as if the main concern is about splitting things into separate 
documents, rather than changing the architecture or specification.

The question of factoring into more, or fewer, documents is always a challenge.

Resolving the charter and producing a threat analysis are our tasks right now.
I do not see how our debating choices in the number of documents to produce will 
accomplish that.


  d/
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  Dave Crocker
  Brandenburg InternetWorking
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